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10 November 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center *Red JM*

FROM: Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting on TNF Scheduled for
12 November at 1600 Hours

Purpose

1. The purpose of the meeting is to obtain Presidential approval of a U.S. negotiating position to be used with the Soviets in the TNF talks scheduled to begin in Geneva on 30 November. (NOTE: Henceforth, TNF (theater nuclear forces) will be referred to as INF (intermediate range nuclear forces).

2. An NSC briefing paper (TAB A) reviews broad U.S. objectives in the negotiations, reviews the agreed elements, and presents options for decision on two remaining key issues:

- How to handle a zero level outcome proposal
- How to handle shorter range missiles.

3. The first of these issues was discussed at the NSPG meeting which you attended on 5 November.

Basic Objectives

4. Not stated in the NSC paper is a general consensus that there is no conceivable INF agreement that is both negotiable with the Soviets and in the U.S. national security interest. Therefore, the political objectives of the negotiation are paramount, i.e.:

- To ensure political support among Allied governments in Europe for deployment of the GLCM and Pershing II
- To convince European and American publics that it is Soviet intransigence which renders impossible the conclusion of arms control agreements which genuinely enhance security.

5. With respect to the first of the above objectives, it is helpful in understanding differences in views between OSD and the other agencies to realize

SECRET

25X1

-2-

that Richard Perle (and apparently his superiors) believes that Allied governments in the final analysis will not accept GLCMs and Pershing II on their soil. Moreover, he believes that the modernization program as presently constituted makes little military sense, and that other weapon systems (e.g., sea-launched cruise missiles) would better redress the imbalance in INF in Europe (as well as not be dependent on Allied support for deployment).

Agreed Elements of U.S. Negotiating Position

6. In short, there is interagency agreement that:

- The first phase of negotiations be limited to land-based missiles only
- The Soviet SS-X-23 short range missile will be limited, but treated separately from longer range missiles
- Third party systems and all sea-based systems will be excluded
- We will discuss aircraft only in context of refuting Soviet claims as to TNF balance
- NTM alone not sufficient for verification. Specific proposals furnished later in negotiations.

Issue One: How should the zero level outcome figure in our opening proposal?

7. There are two options:

- Option A, preferred by the Secretary of Defense and JCS, is to propose only a zero level for specified land-based INF missile systems
- Option B, the choice of State and ACDA, would propose reductions to the lowest possible equal level, with zero as the preferred outcome. It would permit indicating to the Soviets from the outset a willingness to consider equal ceilings greater than zero (but not exceeding the planned 572 GLCM and Pershing II deployment).

8. A fuller description of the options, and the argumentation for each, is contained in pages 2 through 5 of the NSC paper.

9. As this is a policy issue, we have not taken a position. As you know, we prefer a "credible" Option A, as I indicated in the briefing memo for last week's NSPG meeting. The second issue is intimately related to our definition of a credible zero option.

SECRET

25X1

-3-

Issue Two: How to handle the SS-12/22

10. There are two options:

- Option A, the choice of the Secretary of Defense, would include the shorter range SS-12/22 (along with the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5) as systems which would have to be dismantled under the zero option
- Option B, the choice of other agency heads (including the JCS) would limit the SS-12/22 separately from longer range missiles.

11. The argumentation for each option is contained on pages 5 through 7 of the NSC paper.

12. As with Issue One, we have not taken a position on this issue. We would pick Option B if given a choice. The SS-12/22 is simply not in the same class militarily with the SS-20, and including it in a zero option would not be viewed as a serious proposal by our Allies or our critics, and would cast doubt on our commitment to TNF arms control.

- In its argumentation, OSD overstates the capability of the SS-12/22 to substitute for the SS-20.
 - There are currently 252 launchers for the MIRVed SS-20 and another 81 will be deployed at bases now under construction
 - There are about 120 launchers for the single RV SS-12/22 and that number has been constant since 1975
 - The SS-12/22 would have to be forward deployed to substitute for the SS-20, making them vulnerable to NATO weapons which cannot strike the SS-20.

13. In sum, we favor adopting what we call a credible zero level outcome, combining Option A, Issue One with Option B, Issue Two. Our definition of a credible zero level option is one that would be strongly supported by our Allies and would, if accepted by the Soviets, put us in a better position militarily than we are now, or were before the SS-20 was deployed. Zero level GLCMs and Pershing II in exchange for zero level SS-4's, SS-5's, and SS-20's fit this criteria.

14. In the event you wish to take this position at the meeting, I have included appropriate talking points at TAB B.



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